11th September, 2025
Abstract
Diaspora in Action for Democracy and Human Rights (DAHRD) (formerly Foundation The London Story) and Appeals Centre Europe (https://www.appealscentre.eu/) recently organised a workshop on addressing online harms under the European Digital Services Act (DSA). The discussion focused on how the DSA provides new accountability tools, particularly the right to appeal content moderation decisions on social media platforms and explored how these mechanisms can strengthen responses to online harms across contexts, including diaspora communities, to challenge harmful online content visible in the EU.
Introduction
Platforms have long been criticised for opaque content moderation systems, over-reliance on automation, and inconsistent application of their own rules. This has left users, particularly those from vulnerable communities, without meaningful remedies when targeted by hate speech or disinformation narratives. In response, the European Union has established clear, enforceable obligations for platforms through the DSA, to assess and mitigate systemic risks and remove illegal and harmful content and provides new user rights such as appealing content moderation decisions.
While the DSA is formally restricted to the EU, the new user rights provide possible avenues of support for countries such as India, where online harms are escalating. India has witnessed an alarming rise in hate speech and disinformation targeting minorities. DAHRD has documented and analysed the rise of hate speech targeting minorities in India, particularly during politically sensitive periods such as elections. Our research has tracked dangerous organisations and individuals, as well as harmful content that passes without being flagged as violating platform rules, including material that clearly contravenes platforms Dangerous Individuals and Organisations (DIO) and hate speech policies. Much of the content moderation in regional languages is handled through automated systems, with little to no human oversight. The global rollback of content moderation has hit India especially hard, where weak non-English, language-specific moderation and the lack of cultural context in automated systems allow harmful narratives to flourish unchecked.
This is not merely a domestic concern: harmful narratives originating in India circulate widely among diaspora communities, remaining visible across EU platforms. The risks are not abstract and such content has already fuelled real-world unrest, most starkly during the Leicester riots in the United Kingdom in 2022, when online hate campaigns turned into violent street clashes.
In contrast to the EU’s evolving regulatory landscape, India lacks a coherent legal framework to address online hate speech, misinformation, and disinformation. The primary law in this context is the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with the IT Rules, 2021, which place obligations on intermediaries to remove unlawful content. Beyond this, a patchwork of provisions under the Indian Penal Code (such as Sections 153A, 295A, and 505) and election laws can be invoked, but enforcement is inconsistent, politically selective, and vulnerable to abuse against journalists or dissenters. More recently, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA), 2023, has been framed as a safeguard, but it provides no real accountability for platforms or remedies for victims of online harms. Taken together, these laws offer weak and fragmented protections.
Globally, the Digital Services Act (DSA) is seen as an ambitious regulatory framework to address harms arising from illegal and harmful online content, provided that the content is visible in the EU. It establishes a tiered set of obligations, with Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) facing stringent requirements under Articles 33–44. These include mandatory risk assessments (Article 34) and mitigation measures (Article 35) for systemic risks linked to illegal content, election interference, disinformation, and threats to fundamental rights. Importantly, the DSA also strengthens user rights: Article 20 guarantees the right to complain and seek redress for content moderation decisions through accessible internal complaint-handling systems. Article 21 goes a step further, allowing users to appeal platform decisions through certified out-of-court dispute settlement bodies (ODS). Several such bodies such as the Online Platform Dispute Resolution Board (OPDRB) (Hungary), Appeals Centre Europe (ACE) (Ireland), ADROIT (Malta) and User Rights (Germany) have been certified to evolve enforcement disputes impartially and independently with platforms required to bear the costs of the process.
Unlike internal platform complaint systems, ODS’s provide a neutral, human-reviewed process to address three main issues:
- Harmful content – securing removal or demotion of content inciting violence, spreading hate, or amplifying falsehoods.
- Wrongful takedowns – reinstating posts, accounts, or groups that were unfairly removed under vague or inconsistent enforcement.
- Disinformation risks – flagging cases where misleading or false content threatens democratic participation, elections, or civic discourse.
Crucially, while ODS decisions are not legally binding, platforms must justify large-scale non-implementation and are required by law to engage in good faith.
The Process of Reporting
While Article 21 provides the legal basis for the functioning of ODS organisations such as the Appeals Center, the organisations are free to determine their appeal process. The process of reporting harmful content is as follows:
- Individuals or organisations based in the EU must first report the content directly to the platform and can simultaneously file a case with the Appeals Centre-there is no need to wait for the platform’s decision.
- Complaints are submitted via a standard Excel template, downloadable from their website, where hyperlinks and case descriptions (including timestamps for videos) are uploaded. A strong case description should include linguistic, regional, or dog whistle context and, where relevant, links to authoritative sources (fact-checking organisations, UN reports, or news articles).
- Once received, the Appeals Centre sends a notification to both the user and the platform, confirming that the case is under review.
- The Centre requests all related content from the platform (for example, a reported comment, the video it was posted under, and edit history).
- A case review team examines the material, escalates it to specialists if needed, and applies additional research or policy interpretation to evaluate whether platform rules were violated.
- The Appeals Centre issues a recommendation, which platforms are legally obliged to engage with in good faith, though decisions are not formally binding.
Scope of Activity
It is important to note that geographical scope and coverage of the AC are tightly defined under Article 2(1) of the DSA which states that the provisions shall apply only to organisations and persons located in the Union –
- The most crucial condition is that the content must be visible within the EU. For example, Indian organisations can collect links to harmful content and share them with EU partners, who can then file the complaint locally.
- Historical cases are admissible if the complaint to the platform was filed after 2023, following the DSA’s enforcement.
Accountability and Enforcement
According to the Appeals Centre, platforms are increasingly engaging with ODS organisations, and cases are leading to concrete actions such as content removal or reinstatement. Enforcement measures vary, from labelling and fact-checking to demotion, demonetisation, and full removal- with the latter requiring strong evidence of harm (especially in contexts like elections or threats to democratic processes). In practice, ODS organisations apply a harm threshold before recommending action. Criteria include:
- The potential for real-world harm.
- The content’s impact on democratic processes (e.g. during elections).
- Evidence of misinformation or hate speech targeting vulnerable groups.
For civil society, especially outside the EU, ODS organisations offer a pathway: organizations in India, for instance, can compile cases with hyperlinks and context, and EU-based partners can file them if the content is visible within the EU. This creates a diaspora-linked mechanism for tackling online harms globally. Third party interventions under the DSA also strengthen transparency, accountability, and redress by creating a public record of moderation decisions useful for further advocacy and litigation,
Conclusion
The workshop underscored both the promise and the challenges of using the DSA’s ODS framework to tackle online hate speech and disinformation. While implementation remains at an early stage, ODS mechanisms are already beginning to demonstrate their potential through platform engagement and successful interventions.
For organisations addressing diaspora-related harms, ODS organisations offer a valuable new pathway for redress, though its effectiveness will ultimately depend on consistent platform cooperation and the ability of civil society to strategically mobilise these tools. Although grounded in the EU legal framework, ODS mechanisms have implications that extend globally, enabling diaspora groups and civil society actors to challenge harmful online content when it is accessible in Europe. As debates on identity, misinformation, and hate speech in the Indian diaspora persist, it remains to be seen how effectively the DSA’s ODS mechanisms can deliver accountability. What is clear, however, is that ODS creates a structural opportunity to connect local realities with European oversight, opening a new avenue in the global fight against digital harms.
