What are the consequences of Eurocentrism in foreign policy?
What are the consequences of Eurocentrism in Foreign Policy?
MigraVoice* expert, Dr. Miriam Mona Mukalazi, a visiting fellow at the European University Institute in Florence who also works at the Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation, examines how Eurocentrism shapes European responses to peace, conflict and international law. She finds that challenging Eurocentrism reveals the critical contradictions regarding Europe’s credibility as a global peace actor in an increasingly multipolar world. .**
Challenging Eurocentrism is a useful approach to spot the ambiguities within European security and peace policies. It is crucial to acknowledge that, on the one hand, the European Union (EU) and the majority of European states are at the forefront of promoting human rights and peace programmes around the world. Yet, on the other side, it is also a fact that the same actors are conducting massive human rights violations through their foreign policies as well. As a consequence, the EU and European states receive ongoing criticism for this ambiguity. One could argue that it is logical for Europe to prioritise European interests and be Eurocentric. However, a major consequence of Eurocentrism is that it reproduces political power asymmetries both outside of Europe and within. This piece, therefore, argues that challenging Eurocentrism is an approach to understanding how ambiguities unfold and their consequences for global politics.
Consequences of Eurocentrism: Responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
The Russian war against Ukraine illustrates Eurocentrism in European Security policies vividly. Although the conflict began in 2014, it was not until Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 that many Western European states began to treat it as a central security concern. In particular, feminist organisations in Ukraine created tools to deal with the conflict and demanded political action to prevent the conflict from further escalating since 2014. Yet, their concerns remained largely ignored. This delayed response highlights the underlying Eurocentric logic: only when war reaches the perceived “core” of Europe does it generate widespread political urgency, media attention, and strategic prioritisation. This approach to security is problematic for several reasons. For example, Eurocentrism in European foreign policies significantly shapes how security risks and threats are assessed, often reinforcing biased and selective understandings of interregional conflicts and their consequences for global politics. When states from the Global Majority declined to automatically align with Global North calls for political action, it revealed a growing discontent with a Eurocentric framing of peace and security. Many countries pointed to the Global North’s double standards regarding how other wars and occupations on the African continent and in the Americas have been ignored or even supported. It is apparent that normative power and strategic action also coexist among states of the Global Majority. However, the selective solidarity of European states in times of war and conflicts undermines not only the credibility of European peace efforts, it also erodes the possibility for meaningful global cooperation on human rights. Challenging Eurocentrism is thus not only an ethical imperative but a strategic necessity in an increasingly multipolar world.
Consequences of Eurocentrism: Executing Warrants of the International Criminal Court
The inconsistent responses of European states to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in November 2024 raise serious questions about the credibility of this stance. Despite being signatories to the Rome Statute and thus legally obligated to comply with the ICC, some EU member states publicly declared that they would not enforce the warrants. One explanation given by state officials was that the ICC is biased. In April 2025, Hungary even went a step further, announcing its withdrawal from the ICC just as Netanyahu began an official visit to the country. These actions suggest a troubling double standard: Are some states or leaders effectively above international law? Does the principle of legal accountability apply selectively? Certainly, it can be argued that Global Majority States also selectively interpret International Law according to their political interests. Additionally, due to its disproportionate focus on war criminals from the African continent, criticism of the ICC’s perceived bias is not new and has been vividly discussed. Yet, the recent selective enforcement of international legal obligations by European countries highlights a Eurocentric approach to the rule of law, one in which accountability is demanded of others but not always practised “at home.” This fragmentation weakens the EU’s internal cohesion and erodes its credibility as a normative power committed to human rights and the rule of law.
Conclusion
These examples have illustrated that Eurocentrism remains a structural feature of European foreign policies. It significantly influences how international norms, conflicts, and actors are interpreted, prioritised, and engaged with. This shapes not only diplomatic and legal responses but also security strategies, threat perceptions, and decisions around conflict intervention. Unquestionably, double standards exist globally, and ambiguities are not a unique feature of European Foreign Policy. Yet, Europe has positioned itself as a strong supporter of human rights and advocate for multilateralism, a position other political partners also rely on for shaping alliances. Therefore, Europe’s selective engagement with international law and inconsistent responses to global crises raise important questions about the coherence and credibility of European commitments to human rights, peacebuilding, and multilateralism. Addressing these ambiguities is essential for upholding the rule of law and for sustaining the EU’s legitimacy as a normative power in an increasingly multipolar international order.
This is the third blog article in our MigraVoice series written by our MigraVoice expert Dr. Miriam Mona Mukalazi. Interested in contributing writing a blog piece? Sign up for MigraVoice, then send an email to advocacy@thelondonstory.org with a proposal!
*This project is co-funded by the European Union (Project number: LC-02408780). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.Project: ŁC 02408780 — Migrant Voices Matter in the European Media — CNECT/2022/8240201.
** The thoughts expressed in the blog pieces published are that of the author and no responsibility of the organization can be asserted from the pieces.